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INTRODUCTION
What does maximizing shareholder value mean in 2022? Historically, the
role of the corporation has been to maximize profits to present the greatest
financial return to shareholders. 1 Companies are vessels for profit—after all, is
profit not really the endgame of the American Dream? In a May 2020 post on
the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Martin Lipton, a
founding partner of the renowned corporate law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz, articulated corporate purpose as follows:
The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable
and sustainable business in order to create value over the long-term,
which requires consideration of the stakeholders that are critical to its
success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and
communities), as determined by the corporation and the board of
directors using its business judgment and with regular engagement
with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the
corporation’s pursuit of this mission. 2
1
George S. Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 TULANE
L. REV. 639, 648–49 (2021).
2
Martin Lipton, William Savitt, & Karessa L. Cain, On the Purpose of the Corporation, HARVARD LAW
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How, then, should we expect companies to act in the face of public pressure to
appear aligned with social progress and sustainability, as opposed to good oldfashioned profitability? This Comment aims to answer this question in the
context of corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments and socially
responsible investments. As this Comment highlights, the answer varies
depending on who you ask, and such a divergence of thought has caused the
market to initiate the emergence of sustainable investment standards-setters,
companies, environmental groups, and regulators with wildly different solutions
aimed at maximizing the traditional and emerging purpose of the American
corporation as a champion for shareholders and social progress.
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria or metrics “are a “set
of standards for a company’s operations that socially conscious investors use to
screen potential investments.” 3 Such metrics allow socially conscious investors
to evaluate how well or to what extent a company’s operations consider the
environmental, social, and governance-related impacts of their business. 4
Environmental criteria measure the extent a company has a positive or negative
impact on the natural environment or how the company takes climate change
and sustainability into consideration when conducting its business operations. 5
Social metrics examine how companies interact with the people they employ and
the communities they operate in, including community impacts, its employees,
and its customers. 6 Notably, social metrics include consideration of human
capital management, or the idea that “workers can be viewed as ‘assets’ that are
crucial to firm performance and that ought to be managed just as carefully as
physical and financial assets.” 7 Governance concerns the ethics of its internal
operations from the top down, and considers factors like corporate leadership,
executive compensation and ethics, and shareholder rights. 8
Market forces, consumer demand, and investor demand have driven the
implementation of corporate ESG initiatives, leaving companies with no option
but to be more conscious about the way they do business. Investors use ESG
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/27/onthe-purpose-of-the-corporation/#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20a%20corporation,and%20communities)%
2C%20as%20determined%20by.
3
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Criteria, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/environmental-social-and-governance-esg-criteria.asp.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
George S. Georgiev, The “S” in ESG: Human Capital Management, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (March 16,
2022), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2022/03/16/the-s-in-esg-human-capital-management/.
8
Id.
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disclosures not only to determine a company’s alignment with environmental
and social progress, but also in part to measure the risk a given investment
carries.
Many companies have moved to measure their success in several ESG
criteria and have been proactive in disclosing their ESG indicators to the public
to compete with a growing number of other future-oriented companies and
investments. 9 A company or brand’s actual or apparent consideration of
environmental sustainability or social responsibility has become increasingly
tied to its reputation and marketability. However, without any current legal duty
or regulatory guidance as to what ESG measurements to consider and how to
record and disclose them, companies are left to decide what to measure and
disclose on their own. Further, such decisions, including materiality judgments,
are expensive for companies to come by, as they must frequently respond to
shareholder inquiries regarding ESG information. 10
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has long indicated its plan
to focus on ESG disclosure regulation, specifically climate change disclosures,
including a company’s greenhouse gas emissions and financial impacts of
climate change. 11 This Comment was written before the SEC released its March
21, 2022 proposed rule changes for The Enhancement and Standardization of
Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors 12 that would require registrants to
“include certain climate-related disclosures in their registration statements and
periodic reports, including information about climate-related risks that are
reasonably likely to have a material impact on their business, results of
operations, or financial condition, and certain climate-related financial statement
metrics in a note to their audited financial statements.” 13 This Comment
primarily surveys public participation in response to the SEC’s informal March
15, 2021 Request for Public Input (RFPI) on climate disclosures. 14 Responses

9
Andrew Ramonas, SEC Eyes Phased Approach to Climate Reporting, Gensler Says, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Oct. 5, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/esg/sec-eyes-phased-approach-to-climate-reporting-gensler-says.
10
See Georgiev, supra note i, at 720.
11
David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, SEC Regulation of ESG Disclosures, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May 28, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/28/sec-regulation-ofesg-disclosures/.
12
The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Release Nos. 3311042 & 34-94478 (proposed March 21, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 229, 232, 239, and 249)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/33-11042.pdf.
13
Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for
Investors (March 21, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-46.
14
See infra note 74.
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to the RFPI shaped the proposed rule, and they foreshadow what we can likely
expect in response to the proposed rule. 15
The business and environmental risks associated with climate change have
caused investors and sustainability organizations to advocate for SEC attention
to climate change disclosures specifically. While the market has sped ahead of
regulators in terms of favoring ESG initiatives and demonstrating knowledge
that certain ESG disclosures could very likely be required in due time, there has
been less talk around certification frameworks companies can or will be required
to use to ensure their disclosures are vetted and accurate. 16
Climate disclosures are increasingly top of mind for companies and the
public, as we have seen a recent and abrupt shift from some denying the reality
of climate change (ExxonMobil undermined its involvement in and the public
perception of climate change for decades) 17 or refusing to admit that humans are
the cause of global temperature increase to even the largest fossil fuel companies
on the planet vowing sustainability commitments (like ExxonMobil’s 2022
announcement of its pledge to net zero by 2050). 18 Most important are
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as science shows that human-generated GHG
emissions are the cause of global temperature rise, which contributes to global
sea level rise—both of which are serious, existential threats to the way humans
live and conduct business. 19 We know that industry is a major contributor to
GHG emissions, and we know we need to decrease GHG emissions to work
toward a sustainable use of resources on this planet. Investors are increasingly
aware of the risk and uncertainty that climate change poses to the outcome of
their investments, and companies are increasingly aware of the costs associated
with continuing business as usual. 20 Proxy season showed an upward trend of
shareholder proposals on environment and social issues—a trend the SEC has
recognized and has stated it will consider when taking agency action. 21
15

Id.
See Amanda Iacone, SEC Eyes Inconsistent Outside Review of ESG Reporting, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Dec. 6, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/sec-eyes-inconsistent-outside-review-of-esgreporting?context=article-related.
17
Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Rhetoric and frame analysis of ExxonMobil’s climate change
communications, Science Direct, ONE EARTH 696, 701 (May 21, 2021).
18
Press Release, ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil announces ambition for net zero greenhouse gas emissions
by 2050 (Jan. 18, 2022), https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/News/Newsroom/News-releases/2022/0118_ExxonMobilannounces-ambition-for-net-zero-greenhouse-gas-emissions-by-2050.
19
SOURCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
20
Melissa K. Scanlan, Climate Risk is Investment Risk, 36 J. ENV’T LAW AND LITIGATION 1 (2021).
21
James Nani & Lydia Beyoud, Shareholders Up Climate, Social Demands After SEC Policy Shift,
BLOOMBERG LAW (April 4, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/esg/shareholders-up-climate-social-demands-after16
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The demand for corporate sustainability initiatives and sustainable investing
has created a façade of heightened corporate scrutiny, and some companies look
to play optical catch up in the fastest way possible. This has led firms to engage
in “greenwashing” or displaying “proactive public signals, not backed by
operational evidence, that a firm is engaging in sustainability practices.” 22 Such
“demand for ESG considerations in portfolio decision-making creates a potential
conflict of interest (and misaligned incentive) for asset managers to ‘deceptively
endorse’ sustainability principles . . . to attract capital flows, without ensuring
ESG principles are reflected in investment decisions.” 23
Market demand for ESG initiatives and reports will only take us so far. To
ensure that companies are genuinely considering the environmental and social
impacts of their business and weighing the significance of their operations, we
must see tangible actions that address investor concerns and align with social
progress. This Comment argues that the SEC should require disclosure of
material corporate climate risk information in public filings in its rulemaking on
climate change disclosures and other ESG disclosures in the future to ensure
transparency and incentivize climate-forward corporate accountability.
In addition to disclosing material corporate climate risk information,
companies should also invest in third-party verifiers and accountants to ensure
the accuracy of their ESG disclosures and voluntary CSR reports. Without
stringent verification, companies run the risk of inaccurate disclosures and
discrepancies between their disclosures, if mandated by future rulemaking, and
values released in voluntary CSR reports—an issue which the SEC has already
indicated it will pay close attention to, and a potential liability. Further, without
standardization in measurement metrics, investors lose the ability to properly vet
their ESG investments and compare ESG performance over time. This Comment
provides examples of existing standardized disclosure frameworks and how
those frameworks could interact with or fit into SEC rulemaking on climate
disclosures.
This Comment features five Parts. Part I is about market demand for
corporate social responsibility and corporate commitment to ESG initiatives.
Part II discusses the history of ESG and provides a clear timeline of the SEC’s
action regarding ESG disclosure requirements.

sec-policy-shift.
22
Dr. Ryan Clements, Misaligned Incentives in Markets: Envisioning Finance That Benefits All of
Society, 19 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 3 (2021).
23
Id.
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Next, in Part III, this Comment analyzes public responses to the SEC’s RFPI
on climate disclosures by examining a breadth of public comments from Fortune
500 companies, major investment and asset managers, ESG metrics standardssetters, and others. The analysis aims to highlight diverging perspectives
regarding things like what types of ESG disclosures the SEC should require,
how disclosure requirements should be standardized, and whether the SEC
should make such disclosures publicly available.
Part IV discusses critical perspectives on ESG initiatives and disclosure
requirements, both from a perspective that the SEC’s proposed disclosure
requirements are too invasive and from the perspective that ESG is merely a
marketing tool that does not really enhance corporate governance and social
responsibility.
Finally, Part V discusses solutions for moving forward and how the
comments received in response to the RFPI might substantively inform the
Commission’s rulemaking mandating ESG disclosures, even beyond the March
2022 proposed rule to standardize climate-related disclosures.

A. Delta Air Lines Case Study
Atlanta-based Delta Air Lines is one of the major airlines of the United
States, and one of the most widely recognized airlines in the world. As a
commercial airline, Delta’s operations in its normal course of business rely on
emitting tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. However, in recent years,
climate activists and consumers criticize global reliance on major commercial
and private air travel because of inherent association with greenhouse gas
emissions. Memorably, activist Greta Thunberg traveled across the Atlantic
Ocean by sailboat to reach the U.N. Climate Summit in 2019, stoking an existing
conversation in Sweden around flight shaming (or, flygskam), aiming to reduce
global reliance on air travel. 24 Airlines had an inherent marketability problem,
and Delta responded in February 2020 by announcing its plan to commit $1
billion over ten years to become carbon neutral. 25 The announcement was
largely unexpected, as 2020 marked the first year that Delta released an ESG

24
Jeremy Bogaisky, It’s Trying Times for Greta Thunberg’s Hometown Airline, FORBES (Sep. 30, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2019/09/30/its-trying-times-for-greta-thunbergs-hometownairline/?sh=1960e9637eaa.
25
Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Delta Commits $1 billion to become first carbon neutral airline globally
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://news.delta.com/delta-commits-1-billion-become-first-carbon-neutral-airline-globally.

JACKSON_6.9.22

2022]

6/13/2022 4:43 PM

THE IMPACT OF ESG

127

report altogether (although the airline has released annual CSR reports since
2009). 26
This Comment looks at Delta’s ESG net zero pledge as a benchmark to
illustrate how major companies are thinking about ESG in preparation for SEC
rulemaking on mandatory climate disclosures, and how they have acted to satisfy
market and investor demands in their past, present, and prospective future. Delta
has also submitted a response to the SEC’s RFPI regarding climate change
disclosures, and this Comment will provide an overview of the views contained
therein. 27
I.

MARKET DEMAND FOR ESG INITIATIVES, AND HOW THE MARKET HAS
DEVELOPED ESG STRATEGIES OF ITS OWN, ABSENT REGULATION

In February 2021, Bloomberg Intelligence (BI) released an ESG investment
analysis by BI Head of ESG and Thematic Investing EMEA Adeline Diab and
BI Chief Equity Strategist Gina Martin Adams, which showed that global ESG
assets are set to exceed $53 trillion by 2025, which would comprise over a third
of the projected total assets for that year. 28 An article in the Harvard Business
Review suggests that “[t]he number of companies filing . . . CSR . . . reports that
use the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative standards—the most comprehensive
ones available—has increased a hundredfold in the past two decades.” 29 The
increasing release of voluntary CSR reports illustrates companies’ acknowledgement
that investor demand for ESG information is here to stay. Further, the COVID19 pandemic fundamentally changed the way many people interact with
companies and investment opportunities and heightened the move toward
increased ESG interest. 30 However, although demand for ESG-driven corporate
governance policies have increased, regulation has not yet followed, which led

26
Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Delta’s ESG Report: Powering purpose-driven goals to be a catalyst
for change (May 6, 2021), https://news.delta.com/deltas-esg-report-powering-purpose-driven-goals-be-catalystchange.
27
Peter W. Carter, Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer, & Corporate Secretary, Delta Air
Lines, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 16, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8971396-245949.pdf.
28
ESG Assets may hit $53 trillion by 2025, a third of global AUM, BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 23,
2021) https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/esg-assets-may-hit-53-trillion-by-2025-a-third-of-globalaum/.
29
Kenneth P. Pucker, Overselling Sustainability Reporting, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May–June
2021), https://hbr.org/2021/05/overselling-sustainability-reporting.
30
Demand for ESG Investments Soars Emerging from COVID-19 Pandemic, INVESTOPEDIA (July 21,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/demand-for-esg-investments-soars-emerging-from-covid-19-pandemic5193532.
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the SEC to take a hard look at whether and how ESG metrics, beginning with
climate risk disclosures, should be accounted for and disclosed by companies.
One of the major concerns of corporations is that the prospective rulemaking
would require climate disclosures as part of annual 10-K or quarterly 10-Q
filings with the SEC, as such filings are available to the public. Some companies
suggest they furnish the SEC with their climate disclosures rather than include
them in public filings, to limit liability for inaccurate or mistaken reporting. A
10-K filing “is a comprehensive report filed by a publicly-traded company about
its financial performance and is required by the [SEC].” 31 A 10-K includes
information beyond the scope of a company’s annual report, and its purpose is
to “keep investors aware of a company’s financial condition and to allow them
to have enough information before they buy or sell shares in the corporation, or
before investing in the firm’s corporate bonds.” 32 Most important for investors,
the 10-K outlines “any and all risks that the company faces or may face in the
future,” and the forms are readily and easily available and accessible to the
public, often through a company’s website. 33 Note that federal regulations
“prohibit companies from making materially false or misleading statements [or]
from omitting material information that is needed to make the disclosure not
misleading” in 10-K filings. 34
Absent concrete regulation, many companies have moved to align their
disclosures with standards set by third-party organizations specializing in ESG
values disclosures, like the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),
and recommendations by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD). 35
SASB is “an independent, nonprofit organization established in 2011 to set
standards for companies to use when disclosing “sustainability” or “ESG” . . .
information to investors and other providers of financial capital.” 36 The
standards-setter has developed metrics for 77 different industries to identify
10-K, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/10-k.asp.
Id.
33
Id.
34
HOW TO READ A 10-K/10-Q, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersreada10khtm.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
35
TCFD REPORTING, S&P GLOBAL, https://www.spglobal.com/esg/solutions/tcfd-reporting?utm_
source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=TCFD_Search&utm_term=tcfd&utm_content=53441815
0455&gclid=CjwKCAiA9aKQBhBREiwAyGP5laaKvdU9mmzaO-VaMCswVUuFfqQtWV6-lt2uDRFjb3-aTJ
ofnQ5k3BoCc2kQAvD_BwE (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
36
Janine Guillot, Chief Executive Officer, Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Comment Letter
on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (May 19, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8819945-238161.pdf.
31
32
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which climate disclosures and sustainability risks are “reasonably likely to
materially affect the financial condition, operating performance, or risk profile
of a typical company within an industry.” 37 Like SASB, the TCFD is a widelyaccepted authority on climate disclosure frameworks, and the SASB Standards
complement TCFD recommendations.
For example, both the TCFD framework and SASB Standards recognize that
climate-related financial disclosure “should contain both qualitative disclosures
and quantitative metrics.” 38 Qualitative information “provides essential context
to investors, helping them more fully understand the company’s current position,
future prospects, and the relevant circumstances under which performance has
been achieved.” 39 Examples of qualitative information include less tangible
aspects of business, like goodwill. Quantitative metrics “shed light on the
effectiveness of a company’s governance practices, its strategy, its approach to
risk management, and its progress toward key performance targets.” 40 Examples
of quantitative metrics include measurement of a company’s GHG emissions,
which can trend more broad or more narrow depending on which measurement
metric is used. For example, the GHG Protocol, which is the most widely-used
international tool for accounting and categorizing GHG emissions, categorizes
GHG emissions into three scopes: Scope 1 includes a company’s fuel
combustion, Scope 2 encompasses emissions generated by a company’s
purchase and use of power, and Scope 3 covers “all other indirect emissions that
occur in a company’s value chain.” 41
II. FORMER, CURRENT, AND FUTURE TIMELINE FOR SEC-MANDATED
CLIMATE RISK AND OTHER ESG DISCLOSURE REGULATION
A. Where ESG Fits in the Corporate Governance World: ExxonMobil
Shareholder Litigation
In November 2016, ExxonMobil Corp. (Exxon) investors filed a class action
against the company and three Exxon officers alleging that the company’s

37
Id., citing Proposed Changes to the SASB Conceptual Framework & Rules of Procedure – Bases for
Conclusions & Invitation to Comment on Exposure Drafts, SASB (Aug. 28, 2020).
38
HOW DO SASB STANDARDS COMPLEMENT THE TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS?, VALUE REPORTING
FOUNDATION, SASB STANDARDS, https://help.sasb.org/hc/en-us/articles/360059913732-How-do-SASB-Standardscomplement-the-TCFD-recommendations- (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
BRIEFING: WHAT ARE SCOPE 3 EMISSIONS?, CARBON TRUST, https://www.carbontrust.com/resources/
briefing-what-are-scope-3-emissions (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
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failure to disclose climate risks amounted to securities fraud. 42 In that case, the
plaintiffs accused Exxon of making materially false and misleading public
statements during an eight-month period in 2016 for failing to disclose
information from internal reports that showed the company’s knowledge of
adverse impacts to the company as a direct result of risk associated with climate
change. 43 The plaintiffs alleged that such positive misleading public statements
artificially inflated Exxon’s common stock price, which eventually led to
investors’ monetary loss when the stock dropped in value following the
company’s announcements of “the results for its third quarter of 2016, disclosing
it may be forced to de-book almost 20% of its oil and gas reserves . . . the biggest
accounting revision of reserves in ExxonMobil’s history.” 44
Under federal securities laws, plaintiffs initiating a private action for
securities fraud based on an allegation that the defendant either “made an untrue
statement of material fact” or “omitted to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they
were made, not misleading,” must specify in the complaint “each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed.” 45
In Exxon, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that Exxon had made material
misstatements concerning the financial impacts of climate risk in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act. 46 The case shows that climate risk can fall under
the category of material information that could impact a company and that an
investor would likely find important when making investment decisions.
B. SEC Timeline Regarding ESG Disclosures
The origins of investor demand for socially responsible investments and
consumer demand for ethical and transparent business practices are difficult to
trace back to any single event or era. Some have suggested that the concept of
responsible business dealings has faith-based origins. For example, some
suggest the concept of transacting business in a socially responsible way can be
42
43
44
45
46

Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 858.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 859–60 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
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traced back to the ethical foundations of Islam and found in Hadith—the writings
detailing the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. 47 Further, the
founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, “called on his followers to avoid
profiting from businesses harmful to one’s neighbors” in an eighteenth-century
sermon. 48 Some suggest the concept of transacting business in a socially
responsible way can be traced back to the ethical foundations of Islam and found
in Hadith—the writings detailing the deeds and sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad. 49 Sustainable investing has grown and evolved dramatically over
centuries, but according to MSCI, Inc., the largest ESG rating company, “[t]he
practice of ESG investing began in the 1960s as socially responsible investing,
with investors excluding stocks or entire industries from their portfolios based
on business activities such as tobacco production or involvement in the South
African apartheid regime.” 50
Such an evolution has prompted scrutiny over the general lack of regulatory
guidance on ESG, but in 2010, the SEC issued interpretive guidance suggesting
that a registrant’s disclosure of climate risk factors might be required in certain
circumstances. 51 The SEC’s actions marked the Commission’s first indication
that it was considering how climate change risk could apply to existing
disclosure requirements. 52
Regarding a company’s potential disclosure requirements, the 2010
guidance suggested that companies should:
1. “[C]onsider whether the impact of certain existing laws and
regulations regarding climate change is material”;
2. “[C]onsider and disclose when material, the risks or effects on its
business of international accords and treaties relating to climate
change”;

47
Dr. Mohamed Ramady, ESG: Deeply rooted in Islamic economics and ethics, ARAB NEWS (July 31,
2021), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1903011.
48
Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The
Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2020).
49
Dr. Mohamed Ramady, ESG: Deeply rooted in Islamic economics and ethics, ARAB NEWS (July 31,
2021), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1903011.
50
The Evolution of ESG Investing, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-101-what-is-esg/evolution-of-esginvesting#:~:text=The%20practice%20of%20ESG%20investing,the%20South%20African%20apartheid%20re
gime (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
51
SEC, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosures Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290
(Feb. 8, 2010).
52
Id.
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3. “[C]onsider, for disclosure purposes, the actual or potential indirect
consequences it may face due to climate change related regulatory
or business trends”; and
4. “[E]valuate for disclosure purposes the actual and potential material
impacts of environmental matters on their business.” 53
However, the 2010 guidance was not quite effective, in part because of its
reliance on principles-based materiality. 54 In the years following 2010 guidance,
and prior to the Commission’s action on ESG disclosures in the Biden era, the
SEC took little official action toward exploring what mandatory climate risk
disclosure rules could look like. After 2010, companies began gathering and
loosely reporting information pertaining to climate change risks material to their
operation, typically by providing such information in voluntary CSR reports.
Following the inauguration, the Biden Administration announced that
sustainability issues were at the forefront of its regulatory agenda, prompting the
SEC to take official action.
On February 24, 2021, then SEC Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee issued a
statement directing the Division of Corporation Finance “to enhance its focus on
climate-related disclosure in public company filings.” 55 The following week, on
March 3, the SEC’s Division of Examinations announced its Examination
Priorities for 2021, which included enhanced vigilance and “consideration of
[ESG] matters in light of market developments and increasing awareness” in the
space, and prioritization of “emerging risks, including those relating to climate
and ESG[.]” 56 The next day, the SEC announced the creation of a 22-member
Climate and ESG Task Force in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, signaling
increased scrutiny “on climate and ESG-related disclosure and investment,” and
vowing to “develop initiatives to proactively identify ESG-related
misconduct.” 57

53
Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to Business or Legal
Developments Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.
54
George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities
Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 662–64 (2017).
55
Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, SEC, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related
Disclosure (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-relateddisclosure.
56
2021 Examination Priorities, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
files/2021-exam-priorities.pdf.
57
Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues
(March 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42.
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In his March 2, 2021 nomination hearing before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, current SEC Chair Gary Gensler signaled,
consistent with SEC indications prior to Gensler’s confirmation, that ESG
disclosure regulation will be top of mind for the Commission, starting with
climate change disclosures. 58 In his nomination hearing, Gensler testified that
“investors are looking for consistent, comparable, and decision-useful
disclosures around climate risk, human capital, and cybersecurity,” adding that
“[c]ompanies and investors alike would benefit from clear rules of the road” as
it pertains to disclosure requirements. 59
On March 15, Lee delivered a speech at the Center for American Progress to
address the SEC’s increased interest in ESG, citing “the magnitude of the shift
in investor focus . . . toward the analysis and use of climate and other ESG risks
and impacts in investment decision-making.” 60
Lee concurrently issued a statement welcoming public input on climate
change disclosures as a prelude to SEC rulemaking. 61 The statement cited
dramatic growth in “investor demand for, and company disclosure of
information about, climate change risks, impacts, and opportunities,” and
concern over whether the current disclosure requirements adequately inform
investors. 62 Lee requested input regarding, for example, how the Commission
could “best regulate, monitor, review, and guide climate change disclosures in
order to provide more consistent, comparable, and reliable information for
investors while also providing greater clarity to registrants as to what is expected
of them,” and “the advantages and disadvantages of developing a single set of
global standards applicable to companies around the world . . . versus multiple
standard setters and standards[.]” 63
The SEC’s focus on ESG was only intensified by President Biden’s May 20,
2021, Executive Order on Climate-Related Financial Risk, which declared that
58
Nomination Hearing, Gary Gensler and The Honorable Rohit Chopra, Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 117th Cong. (March 2, 2021), https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/
02/22/2021/nomination-hearing.
59
Testimony, Gary Gensler, SEC Chair, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/gensler-2021-0914.
60
Speech, Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, SEC, A Climate for Change: Meeting Investor Demand for
Climate and ESG Information at the SEC (March 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-climatechange.
61
Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, SEC, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change
Disclosures (March 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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he viewed it as a responsibility of his Administration “to advance consistent,
clear, intelligible, comparable, and accurate disclosure of climate-related
financial risk.” 64
In his September 1, 2021, remarks before the European Parliament
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Gensler alluded that the
Commission was paying attention to corporate greenwashing, stating that he had
“directed staff to review current practices and consider recommendations about
whether fund managers should disclose the criteria and underlying data they
use” to “brand themselves as ‘green,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘low-carbon,’ and so on.” 65
Notably, the SEC included “[d]isclosure relating to climate risk, human
capital, including workforce diversity and corporate board diversity, and
cybersecurity risk” in its Spring 2021 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions. 66 The Climate Change Disclosure remained on the
Commission’s Fall 2021 agenda, noting that the SEC’s Division of Corporation
Finance was “considering recommending that the Commission propose rule
amendments to enhance registrant disclosures regarding issuers’ climate-related
risks and opportunities.” 67
On September 22, 2021, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance released
a sample letter to companies regarding climate change disclosures, stating that
“information related to climate change-related risks and opportunities may be
required in disclosures related to a company’s description of business, legal
proceedings, risk factors, and management’s discussion and analysis of financial
condition and results of operations.” 68 In light of that potential requirement, the
letter prepared companies to answer questions regarding things like
discrepancies in information between a company’s voluntary CSR report and

64
White House Briefing Room Fact Sheet: President Biden Directs Agencies to Analyze and Mitigate
the Risk Climate Change Poses to Homeowners and Consumers, Businesses and Workers, and the Financial
System and the Federal Government Itself (May 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/05/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-directs-agencies-to-analyze-and-mitigate-the-riskclimate-change-poses-to-homeowners-and-consumers-businesses-and-workers-and-the-financial-system-andfederal-government/.
65
Speech, Gary Gensler, SEC Chair, Remarks before the European Parliament Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-remarks-european-parliament090121.
66
Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Annual Regulatory Agenda (June 11, 2021) https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2021-99.
67
Id.
68
Sample Letter to Companies Regarding Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/sample-letter-climate-change-disclosures (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).

JACKSON_6.9.22

2022]

6/13/2022 4:43 PM

THE IMPACT OF ESG

135

SEC filings, a company’s “material litigation risks related to climate change,”
and capital expenditures for climate-related projects. 69
In summary, the SEC issued its proposed rule that would mandate certain
climate risk disclosures over a year after it first loosely requested public input
on the issue. It seems a long time coming, but the Commission has had to weigh
input from environmental advocates and socially responsible investors with that
of corporate interests. 70 On one side, activists stress the need for companies to
disclose their own greenhouse gas emissions and those generated by their
suppliers. 71 On the other side, corporate groups seek a narrow rule to limit
corporate liability for inaccurate disclosures and decrease costs spent in
preparing and reporting emissions data. 72
III. RESPONSES TO THE SEC’S RFPI
Lee’s March 15, 2021, RFPI asked that comments be submitted within 90
days of the date of the statement, which would have been June 13, 2021, but the
SEC has continued to receive and publish public comments to the RFPI, even
into April 2022. 73 Comments responsive to the proposed rule should be received
on or before May 20, 2022. 74 The release of the proposed rule has caused another
influx of public comments on the webpage for comments responding to the
RFPI. 75 The SEC received over 700 unique comments on climate change
disclosures in total; 422 of those were submitted on or before the RFPI deadline
for review. 76
The comments received spanned thousands of pages and included a breadth
of perspectives and depth of evidence and information. Companies,
environmental groups, and sustainable investment activists responded with
detailed information regarding both the corporate burden and potential
69

Id.
Katanga Johnson, Companies worry U.S. SEC climate rule may require broad emissions disclosures,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/companies-worry-us-sec-climaterule-may-require-broad-emissions-disclosures-2022-01-19/.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.
sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12.htm (last visited April 6, 2022).
74
The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Release Nos. 3311042 & 34-94478 (proposed March 21, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 229, 232, 239, and 249)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/33-11042.pdf.
75
Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.
sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12.htm (last visited April 6, 2022).
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environmental and investor impact of mandatory climate change disclosures.
Multiple policy analysts for the Heritage Foundation, a well-known conservative
think tank and advocate of “free enterprise” and “limited government” submitted
comments criticizing the SEC’s move toward climate change disclosures
altogether. 77 Such a massive interest in the RFPI indicates the likelihood of
extensive response to the proposed rule, as the SEC has now elevated its
disclosure aspirations to a formal proposal, initiating notice-and-comment
rulemaking on the issue.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), notice-and-comment
rulemaking requires agencies to give the public notice of impending agency
action and the opportunity to participate by providing feedback. 78 Agencies must
then consider the feedback received and incorporate into their adopted rules a
concise statement of their basis and purpose. 79 However, the APA section on
public rulemaking proceedings initiated by agencies explicitly excepts
“interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice” from APA rulemaking guidelines. 80
With respect to the APA, the SEC’s RFPI was just that; the Commission had
no duty to consider and respond to comments at the RFPI stage as they will
during notice-and-comment rulemaking. Comments received in response to the
RFPI and excerpted below were only considered by the SEC as an overview of
the many issues to consider before they introduced the proposed rule; however,
they do reflect a basis for the SEC’s new proposed rule, and they indicate how
the proposed rule might change before becoming an official agency directive to
public companies.
A. SEC Letter Type Responses
In addition to unique comments, the SEC received over 5,800 submissions
of any of the four form letter type comments from individuals and entities whose
identities were not published on the SEC’s website. 81
77
David R. Burton, Senior Fellow in Economic Policy, The Heritage Foundation, Comment Letter on
SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
climate-disclosure/cll12-8914466-244728.pdf; Katie Tubb, Senior Policy Analyst, Energy and Environment,
The Heritage Foundation, Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8907322-244259.pdf.
78
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
79
Id.
80
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
81
Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.
sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
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1. Letter Type A
Letter type A suggests that climate change disclosures be required,
standardized, and certified to help reduce corporate climate impacts:
I request that disclosure requirements be streamlined to follow verified
scientific methods shown to reduce a brand’s climate impact, such as
the standards set forth by the Science Based Targets initiative, in an
effort to make measuring a company’s disclosure consistent and
simple to understand for consumers and investors. 82

2. Letter Type B
Letter Type B advocates for expanded corporate CSR reports and mandated
disclosures to encourage corporate transparency:
The Securities and Exchange Commission should require that
corporate managers be more transparent with shareholders regarding
their long-term plans. When I think about where to invest my money,
I want to know which companies are serious about a just, green future.
It is the SEC’s job to keep corporations from hiding their contribution
to the climate crisis and environmental destruction or from lying to the
public about their role. Corporations also need to be honest about what
they’re doing to stop climate change and how they are planning for a
future affected by an accelerating climate crisis. 83

3. Letter Type C
Letter Type C encourages SEC rules mandating climate change disclosures,
including disclosures regarding a company’s suppliers’ greenhouse gas
emissions:
Climate change poses potentially catastrophic risks to the
environment, communities, and the financial system. As a result, it is
vital for you to require climate-related disclosures in order to meet the
SEC’s mandate to protect investors; ensure fair, orderly, and efficient
markets; and facilitate capital formation. 84

82
Letter Type A, Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-lettertype-a.htm last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
83
Letter Type B, Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-lettertype-b.htm last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
84
Letter Type C, Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-lettertype-c.htm last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
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4. Letter Type D
Letter Type D reflects a desire for corporate climate change disclosures as
well as increased scrutiny of other corporate ESG initiatives:
The SEC should require companies and banks to reveal information
about their climate risks, contribution to climate change (including
total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions), and other
sustainability issues like fair treatment of workers and communities,
diversity, equity, and inclusion, environmental and economic benefits
and harms, and political spending. 85

B. Public Comments Received in Response to SEC’s RFPI Regarding Climate
Change Disclosures
1. Corporations
a. Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com Inc., Autodesk, Inc., eBay Inc., Facebook,
Inc., Intel Corporation and Salesforce.com, Inc. 86
Some of the largest leading American tech and e-commerce companies,
including Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com Inc., Autodesk, Inc., eBay Inc.,
Facebook, Inc., Intel Corporation and Salesforce.com, Inc., issued a joint letter
in response to the RFPI, acknowledging the need for mandatory corporate
climate disclosures, but warned against requiring such disclosures in annual,
quarterly, and other documents filed with the SEC. 87 The letter states: “Given
that climate disclosures rely on estimates and assumptions that involve inherent
uncertainty, it is important not to subject companies to undue liability, including
from private parties.” 88
The letter also called for “a principles-based framework, guided by SEC’s
longstanding definition of materiality, and designed for climate reporting.” 89
The companies called for the adherence to a disclosure framework such as that

85
Letter Type D, Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-lettertype-d.htm last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
86
Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com Inc., Autodesk, Inc., eBay Inc., Facebook, Inc., Intel Corporation and
Salesforce.com, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8907252-244227.pdf.
87
Id.
88
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employed by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD)
to accommodate potential disclosures from companies across many industries. 90
b. Chevron 91
In 2021, Chevron ranked 27 in the Fortune 500 list of top U.S. companies by
revenue and is one of the largest oil companies in the world. 92 In response to the
SEC’s RFPI, Chevron submitted a five-page letter stating it “supports efforts to
enhance the consistency and comparability of climate-related information,”
noting that it has reported its U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to the EPA since
2011. 93
The letter asks for the SEC’s flexibility in rulemaking, and specifically
requests a phased approach to climate change disclosure requirements, and
“measures to appropriately address liability considerations, such as safe harbor
protections and allowing the information to be furnished, and not filed, for
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” 94
c. Delta 95
In its letter, Delta states that it supports “the Commission’s ongoing efforts
to address decision-useful climate change disclosure,” and adds that its 2020
inaugural voluntary ESG report came about after “more than 200 calls with
investors” and responses to “more than 100 other shareholder inquiries”
regarding the company’s sustainability matters, signaling heightened investor
interest in ESG reporting. 96
Consistent with many other corporate responses to the RFPI, Delta
acknowledged that “clear, transparent communication of important information
90

Id.
David A. Inchausti, Vice President and Controller, Chevron Corporation, Comment Letter on SEC
Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
climate-disclosure/cll12-8906904-244215.pdf.
92
Chevron, Fortune, https://fortune.com/company/chevron/fortune500/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
93
David A. Inchausti, Vice President and Controller, Chevron Corporation, Comment Letter on SEC
Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
climate-disclosure/cll12-8906904-244215.pdf.
94
Id.
95
Peter W. Carter, Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer, & Corporate Secretary, Delta Air
Lines, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 16, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8971396-245949.pdf.
96
Peter W. Carter, Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer, & Corporate Secretary, Delta Air
Lines, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (June 16, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8971396-245949.pdf.
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about [its] climate change efforts is valued by [its] investors,” but encouraged
the Commission to allow companies to furnish their climate-change metrics to
the SEC rather than make the metrics available in public filings. 97 Further, Delta
requested a liability safe harbor for climate change metrics, “given inherent
calculation difficulties and the rapid pace at which climate change analyses and
disclosures have developed.” 98 Finally, the letter added that “a disclosure
framework that incorporates existing standards (subject to financial materiality
considerations . . . ) . . . that have been thoroughly vetted and are widely accepted
by both public companies and their investors . . . could enhance the consistency,
comparability, and reliability of climate change disclosure.” 99
The letter states that by adhering to a standardized, widely adopted
disclosure framework, companies can reduce the cost burden of gathering and
reporting climate disclosure information by using the same metrics, like those
employed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the
TCFD, across the board. 100
d. Walmart 101
Walmart is the largest company in the world by revenue, ranking number
one on the Fortune 500 list of top corporations in 2021. 102 The company has
reported climate-related information for 15 years, according to its letter in
response to the RFPI, and Walmart representatives have met with SEC officials
in the Division of Corporation Finance at least twice to discuss climate change
disclosures, according to memoranda available on the SEC website. 103
Straying from the tone of the corporate comments requesting that climate
metrics be furnished rather than filed, Walmart’s letter states with confidence
the company’s belief that ESG reporting “will continue to be reported outside
filings under the federal securities laws for a number of years to come because
its relevance and materiality are not universal or well-established.” 104 The letter
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Walmart, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8911753-244396.pdf.
102
Walmart, Fortune, https://fortune.com/company/walmart/#:~:text=Walmart%20is%20the%20world’s
%20largest,grocery%20stores%20in%2024%20countries (last accessed Feb. 13, 2022).
103
Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.
sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
104
Walmart, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8911753-244396.pdf.
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suggests that allowing metrics to be furnished rather than filed will allow
companies to adjust to ESG disclosure requirements free from liability and pave
the way “for potential future integration of ESG information into . . . filings as
appropriate.” 105
The letter also states that several potential climate-change impacts may be
relevant and material to the business of companies, though which factor “is most
financially relevant or material for a company [for disclosure purposes] depends
on that company’s industry, business model, strategy, and other factors.” 106
Because of potential differences, Walmart supports the Commission adhering to
a “principles-based disclosure” model, like those employed by the SASB and
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 107
2. Investment Managers
a. BlackRock 108
BlackRock is the world’s largest investment and asset management
corporation, with a portfolio of nearly $10 trillion in assets. 109 In 2022,
BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink released his “2022 Letter to CEOs”
on “The Power of Capitalism.” 110 In his letter, Fink described the shift toward
stakeholders’ expectation that “companies play a role in decarbonizing the
global economy.” 111 Further, Fink explained, climate risk and investment risk
go hand in hand, and companies must make sustainability and net zero
commitments in order to compete. 112 Regarding BlackRock, Fink noted: “We
focus on sustainability not because we’re environmentalists, but because we are
capitalists and fiduciaries to our clients.” 113

105

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8906794-244146.pdf.
109
Dawn Lim, BlackRock Closes In on the Once Unthinkable, $10 Trillion in Assets, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (July 14, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-now-has-close-to-10-trillion-under-management-116
26259550.
110
Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, BlackRock, Larry Fink’s 2022 Letter to CEOS:
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accessed Feb. 13, 2022).
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In its comment letter to the SEC, BlackRock asserted that “it is essential to
work towards a single, globally applicable, mandatory disclosure framework and
set of standards [for disclosures] . . . aligned with the TCFD framework and
sector-specific metrics.” 114 The asset manager also suggested ramping up
disclosure metrics over time and emphasized the importance of both qualitative
and quantitative reporting. 115 BlackRock supported a disclosure framework that
would provide investors with quantitative measures, including Scope 1 and
Scope 2 GHG emissions data. 116 Noting that Scope 3 GHG emissions data may
require a phased approach, BlackRock also asserted the need for a temporary
safe harbor “where data and methodologies are still emerging.” 117
b. The Vanguard Group, Inc. 118
The Vanguard Group, Inc. (Vanguard) is the second largest investment
group in the world, 119 and markets products that lessen investor exposure to ESG
risks or “companies that don’t align with [an investor’s] values.” 120
Like BlackRock, Vanguard called for a proposal adhering to ESG
frameworks already established by the TCFD and the SASB. 121 By working
within such “widely respected investor-oriented frameworks,” the comment
states, climate risk disclosures may be more easily compared over time. 122
Further, Vanguard advocates for a phase-in of climate disclosure requirements
and suggests that “the SEC provide flexibility to issuers to disclose through the
10-K or website, or other voluntary means, to address companies’ liability
concerns associated with providing climate change information via Form 10K.” 123
114
BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures
(June 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8906794-244146.pdf.
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World’s Top Asset Management Firms, ADV Ratings, https://www.advratings.com/top-assetmanagement-firms (last accessed Feb. 13, 2022).
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Our approach to ESG investing: Engage, allocate, and avoid, Vanguard (June 17, 2021),
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3. Sustainability Accounting Standards Setter, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB)
While companies and investors have called for the adoption of uniform
standards like SASB Standards in climate disclosure rulemaking, the SASB
itself has also responded to the RFPI. 124 As a standard-setter, SASB argues for
adherence to disclosure frameworks companies are already working within to
ease the transition into mandatory disclosures and enhance the transparency and
timeliness of disclosure. 125 SASB says, by adopting an existing framework like
SASB Standards, the SEC can “focus its resources and expertise on
implementation, evaluation. . . and enforcement activities,” and investment
companies can cut down on costs associated with disclosures, as many already
rely on standards set by SASB and others. 126
SASB notes that adopting an existing framework would not preclude the
SEC from requiring additional or more specific disclosures where “necessary or
appropriate.” 127 Further, the SEC should consider international rulemaking that
is ongoing in this area, as the EU’s potential adoption of specific standards could
have implications for multinational corporations. 128 Finally, SASB asks that the
SEC should consider a limited safe harbor to protect companies from private
plaintiff liability, as such a safe harbor would “facilitate the development and
dissemination of sustainability disclosures that are more decision-useful than
boilerplate disclosures.” 129
4. Other Interested Parties
a. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 130
In its comment letter, environmental advocacy nonprofit organization
NRDC suggests, “[i]n considering enhanced climate-related disclosures, the
SEC must recognize that its mission is not simply to protect investors . . .
[r]ather, the SEC’s mission also includes the promotion of ‘fair, orderly, and
124
Janine Guillot, Chief Executive Officer, Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Comment Letter
on SEC Request for Public Input on Climate Change Disclosures (May 19, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8819945-238161.pdf.
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efficient’ markets, capital formation, and protection of the public interest.” 131
The environmental organization suggests far stricter requirements than
requested by most companies, and urges the SEC to promulgate strong rules that
require public filing of Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 GHG emissions and
adhere to standards set by the TCFD and others with the consideration of
stronger, updated requirements where appropriate. 132
The letter urges the SEC to adopt climate-related disclosures that “require
public companies to file public disclosures regarding their emissions of
greenhouse gases, their vulnerability to the physical and transition risks of
climate change, their process for identifying climate-related risks and
opportunities, and their corporate governance structure for sustainability.” 133
NRDC’s comment generally argues against a “comply or explain” framework,
which “would allow an issuer to either (1) comply with the disclosures regulated
by the commission; or (2) explain why it will not,” 134 as it could “enable some
issuers to dodge disclosures and reduce the effectiveness of a mandatory
reporting regulation. 135
b. Society for Corporate Governance 136
The Society for Corporate Governance (the “Society”) is a business trade
association comprised of corporate secretaries, in-house counsel, and other
governance professionals “responsible for supporting the work of corporate
boards of directors and the executive managements of their companies on
corporate governance and disclosure matters.” 137 The Society, in its letter,
advocated for no change to “the SEC’s existing principles-based disclosure
scheme rooted in materiality,” as, it argues, the existing scheme already
encompasses climate risk disclosures and provides investors with enough
information to make informed decisions about their investments. 138
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Further, the Society advocates that, in the event the SEC does mandate
climate disclosures, companies be allowed to post their disclosure information
to their websites or otherwise furnish the information to the SEC as opposed to
including it within public filings. 139 Corporations are required only to publish or
provide accurate information, the Society argues, and including climate risk
information in public securities filings does nothing more than expose
companies to the unnecessary risk of private plaintiff litigation. 140
Finally, the Society makes a few additional points that diverge from the
views expressed by some companies, investment groups, and environmental
groups. 141 First, to avoid substantial costs and burdens to companies, the SEC
should not require an accounting of “prescriptive, quantitative disclosures” by
third-party auditing firms. 142 Next, the SEC should consider a “disclose or
explain” framework that permits companies to either comply with a requested
disclosure, “or explain why they have not (for example, if the measure has not
yet been implemented, if they do not yet have the data available, or if the metric
is not material to the company).” 143 Lastly, if the SEC does proceed with climate
disclosure mandates, “[a]ny new climate or sustainability-related disclosure
requirements . . . should be governed by the [APA], i.e., undertaken only with
proper notice of proposed and final rulemaking and with ample opportunity for
public comment.” 144 The Society favors the Commission’s development of
climate disclosure standards, rather than the adoption of an already widelyaccepted framework. 145
c. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP 146
Accounting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PWC) highlighted Lee’s
statement in the RFPI, noting that “while existing Regulation S-K rules require
issuers to make certain climate disclosures, questions arise about whether these
disclosures adequately inform investors about known material risks,
uncertainties, impacts, and opportunities, and whether greater consistency could
be achieved.” 147
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PWC advocates for SEC rulemaking mandating and expanding climate
disclosures, and argues that requiring companies to include climate disclosures
in their 10-K Forms will increase the “quality and consistency” of reported
metrics. 148 Further, as “[a]lmost all audit reports on financial statements filed
with the SEC must be issued by independent accountants registered with the
PCAOB [the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board], and those audits
must be conducted under PCAOB standards,” PWC asserts that “reports on
climate change disclosures should be subject to the same requirements.” 149 By
requiring companies to incorporate their climate disclosures into public filings,
they will be held to the higher standard of ensuring their metrics through vetted
accounting procedures and audits. 150
IV. CRITICISM OF ESG, OTHER ISSUES, AND CONSIDERATIONS
A. Current Lack of Consistent Measurement Standards, Metrics, and
Expectations
While third-party ESG disclosure standards setters help inform companies
about what types of disclosures they should or could be required to provide,
third-party accounting firms help companies measure and calculate the numbers
that go into those frameworks. However, without adherence to one uniform
framework across the board, accounting firms hired by companies to crunch
ESG numbers are left to decide which standards to use on their own.
Not only do third-party verifiers of ESG reporting use inconsistent metrics
to analyze and value ESG numbers—some companies do not employ private
verifiers at all. According to a December 2021 article in Bloomberg Tax, “[o]nly
half of big companies hire a third party to review their sustainability disclosures,
and almost none choose an accounting firm to provide that scrutiny.” 151 This
lack of oversight and consistency in measuring and reporting is not surprising
given that the SEC has only just issued its long-promised proposed rule on
climate change disclosures.
In December 2021, Bloomberg Businessweek released a study on the
methodologies employed by MSCI, Inc., revealing that their ESG statistics are
148
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not based on “a company’s impact on the Earth and society. In fact, they gauge
the opposite: the potential impact of the world on the company and its
shareholders.” 152 The firm’s website states that “MSCI offers a suite of tools to
help institutional investors benchmark, measure and manage portfolio exposure
to climate risk,” among other targets. 153
The Bloomberg Businessweek story goes on to highlight that the ratings
factored in initiatives that companies were already doing, or were already
required to do, like adopting “bans on things that are already crimes, such as
money laundering and bribery.” 154 In the environmental category, for example,
ratings factored in “Water Stress”, which “measures whether the local
community has enough water for the company, not whether the company is
stressing the local water supply.” 155
B. Republican Criticism of ESG Disclosure Mandates
1. Republican Members of U.S. House Committee on Financial Services 156
The twenty-two Republican members of the Congressional committee
tasked with overseeing all components of housing and financial services sectors
submitted a comment in response to the RFPI arguing that the SEC’s focus on
mandating climate disclosures goes beyond the scope of the Commission’s
authority entirely. 157 However, the Representatives argue, in moving forward
with disclosure mandates, the SEC should avoid adopting the framework of
third-party standards setters and regulate only through APA notice-andcomment rulemaking. 158 Even further, the Representatives allege that SEC
attention to climate change is overstepping its political insulation as an
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independent financial regulator, insinuating that climate change is merely a
political issue. 159
2. Republican Members of U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs 160
In the Senate, the twelve Republicans tasked with oversight of US financial
services sectors argued that, because extensive disclosures are already required
under federal securities laws, there are no updates needed regarding climate
change disclosure. 161 Further, they argue, employing the framework set forth by
a third-party standards setter would be an unlawful delegation of authority under
the APA, and the SEC should craft its own rules in moving forward with
mandatory climate disclosure. 162
3. Georgia Attorney General Christopher M. Carr 163
In line with his fellow Republicans, Georgia Attorney General Christopher
M. Carr issued a letter stating that “the Commission should stay in its legally
authorized lane,” and that “businesses are up to the task of disclosing relevant
information about environmental issues without additional climate-changefocused disclosure requirements.” 164
C. International Action
The European Union (EU) has developed and codified its Sustainable
Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), 165 for the purpose of incentivizing
sustainability-oriented investments and requiring public disclosures regarding
how firms are “incorporating sustainability considerations [in] their investment
decisions,” including the way climate change is expected to impact investment
performance. 166
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Alessandro d’Eri, a senior policy officer at the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s securities markets regulator, was quoted
in an October 2020 story in CNBC that highlighted several challenges presented
by ESG and impact investing. 167 D’Eri stressed that there is a growing number
of ESG rating providers, despite ESG rating being a largely unregulated and
nonuniform area. 168 Further, he states that there is a “mismatch” between
investor demand for more ESG funds and the availability of certified ESG
products in the market. 169 In the same story, Kristen Sullivan, a partner and US
sustainability and ESG services leader at Deloitte explained that, while
American companies are voluntarily moving forward in calculating ESG data
absent regulation or uniform standards, there is a “regulatory momentum” on
ESG certification taking place in Europe. 170
On February 3, 2022, ESMA published a Call for Evidence for ESG ratings,
which invited stakeholders to submit responses to a questionnaire “to develop a
picture of the size, structure, resourcing, revenues and product offerings of the
different ESG rating providers operating in the EU.” 171 The Call for Evidence
indicates ESMA’s intent to regulate the market for ESG rating providers
operating in the EU and “follows ESMA warning to European Commission that
the lack of regulation of ratings and data assessments pose a risk to investors.” 172
In the coming months, regulators could look to responses to the ESMA Call for
Evidence to inform disclosure rulemaking in the US.
D. ESG Criticism from Former BlackRock Official
In August 2021, Tariq Fancy, the former CIO of Sustainable Investing at
BlackRock, published a three-part essay on Medium detailing his experience at
the asset manager and his critiques of ESG investments. 173 Fancy’s critique,
“The Secret Diary of a ‘Sustainable Investor,’” sets the stage for an investment
167
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landscape that recognizes market demand for sustainability and social
responsibility, yet falls short of providing solutions that please investors and
enhance social change or responsibility. 174
Fancy argues that much of the effort in ESG investing is “focused on
integrating ESG considerations” into existing frameworks, funds, and
companies, “which for many seems to be a proxy for overlaying ‘purpose’ onto
traditional models to extract profits.” 175 Fancy summarizes interactions he had
with colleagues while at BlackRock as signaling to a widespread belief in the
asset management world that ESG consisted of checking regulatory boxes and
drumming up hype in otherwise mundane or even failing companies. 176 Finally,
Fancy makes the point that “[s]ustainable investing is becoming a deadly
distraction” by convincing shareholders, investors, and the general public that
ESG was leading to a more sustainable economy without ensuring the reliability
of ESG data, ratings, and contributions. 177
Other professionals in the investment world have challenged Fancy’s
critique, highlighting Fancy’s conflation of ESG funds (focused on managing
risk) and impact investing (focused on creating a positive social impact on the
world). 178 In a Forbes Magazine interview, Clara Miller, an ESG professional
with decades of nonprofit experience in the world of sustainable finance, argued
that Fancy’s critique fell short of showing that ESG presents irreparable
problems or conflicts of interest with the aims it claims to accomplish. 179
Investment professionals, Miller says, have been keenly aware of the problems
with ESG that Fancy raised in his critique for years now—the difference is that
others have been working to fix the present issues rather than paint ESG as
completely doomed and unable to make any impact whatsoever. 180
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CONCLUSION: WHAT DO THE COMMENTS, CRITICISMS, AND RULEMAKING
INTENTIONS THEMSELVES TELL US ABOUT WHERE ESG IS HEADING?
ESG disclosure is an emerging field composed of many stakeholders with
differing views as to what ESG should be, whether and how we should measure
ESG metrics, and whether companies and investment managers can promote
social progress through a capitalist financial framework. Before the release of
the proposed rule, this Comment posed:
As a case study, responses to the SEC’s RFPI highlighted in this
Comment illustrate a lack of agreement on what the SEC should
require if climate or other ESG disclosures are mandated, which
standards it should require companies to use to vet and disclose their
metrics, whether the RFPI has gone far enough to prime regulatory
action on ESG, and even whether the Commission can conduct
rulemaking on climate and other ESG disclosures at all. Without
notice-and-comment rulemaking by the SEC, there will be no change
to the current guidance allowing companies to disclose what they find
material when and where they choose, and companies will be allowed
to make voluntary pledges to sustainability without facing the public
scrutiny and private liability that would hold them accountable if
disclosures were made in public filings.

Although we now have a proposed rule, discrepancies between voluntary CSR
reports and disclosures in filings will likely remain an issue unless there is a
uniform measurement framework for disclosure values.
For example, although Delta has made a net zero pledge, its commitment
requires the company to purchase many corporate offsets to reach its goal. 181
Therefore, underneath a qualitative commitment like carbon neutrality lies a
multitude of other issues and considerations; carbon offsets, for example, require
stringent certification and verification in order to ensure they are actually
offsetting the amount of carbon they claim to be. Delta is an illustrative example
of how climate disclosures will require significant vetting if we ever want to be
sure that they are aiding progress toward environmental change. For other ESG
metrics, the amount of work required on the back end will increase as metrics
and their impact become more difficult to measure.
If companies, investors, and the public want ESG to matter, there need to be
standardized reporting requirements and a solid trajectory toward regulation.
181
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Note that a year passed between the SEC’s indication that it planned to focus on
climate disclosure regulation and its release of a proposed rule. The SEC has
now delivered on its promise to propose a rule that would mandate climate
change disclosures in securities filings. As companies and investors begin to
participate in rulemaking on the proposal, this Comment poses: How might the
proposal change over the rulemaking process? Would even the most stringent of
disclosure frameworks actually bring about positive social change through
market regulation? And how might such a new rule forever change the role of
the American corporation in society?

